Hugin & Munin Journal

A satellite is physically out of reach, but not outside the systems of trust, command, and recovery that keep it alive. Satellites seem protected by distance, which is why satellite cybersecurity is so easily misunderstood. They are above the weather, above borders, above fences and server rooms and locked cabinets. No attacker can walk up to one with a screwdriver. No careless employee can leave one open in a café. No technician can plug in a mysterious USB stick during a maintenance visit. Orbit feels like security by physical impossibility. That is the comforting half of the truth. The same distance that protects a satellite from casual tampering also makes it extraordinarily hard to recover. A server can be rebuilt. A router can be replaced. A laptop can be wiped. Even a damaged undersea cable can, with enough money and patience, be repaired. Remote terrestrial infrastructure can also be difficult to reach, but space makes that difficulty permanent and non-nego...

Space is large, but useful orbit is not. The regions around Earth used for communications, navigation, weather forecasting, military surveillance, disaster response, climate observation and scientific research are not an empty cosmic attic into which machines can be discarded without consequence. They are becoming a working layer of civilisation. That layer is growing more valuable as it becomes more crowded. Cheaper launch, mass-produced satellites and commercial constellations have changed the rhythm of space activity. The older space age revolved around a comparatively small number of costly national missions. The emerging one depends upon repetition: more launches, more spacecraft, shorter replacement cycles and services expected to function continuously. Industrial systems produce waste, but waste in orbit does not sit in a landfill. A failed satellite continues moving at several kilometres per second. A spent rocket stage may remain intact for decades or break apart after an ...

Europe’s anxiety about artificial intelligence is usually framed as a problem of models, chips, cloud capacity and regulation. Beneath those arguments lies a simpler fear: Europe may become a permanent user of systems whose price, development and availability are controlled elsewhere. The same danger now shadows the European space industry. A continent can operate satellites, fund agencies and speak fluently about strategic autonomy while depending on foreign providers for launch capacity, secure communications, terminals, orbital services or rapid expansion during a crisis. Ownership of individual assets does not necessarily amount to control over the system connecting them. Europe is not absent from space. Galileo and Copernicus are major pieces of public infrastructure. European companies manufacture sophisticated satellites and instruments. Ariane 6 is operational, and IRIS² is intended to provide secure European connectivity. The European Space Agency is also trying to diversi...